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Avi-Yonah and Wells:

DRAFT 081618
THE BEAT AND TREATY OVERRIDES:
A BRIEF RESPONSE TO ROSENBLOOM AND SHAHEEN
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1
Bret Wells2
In a recent paper posted on SSRN, Profs. David Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen argue that
the Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) (IRC section 59A), as enacted in 2017, is a
potential violation of Articles 23 and 24 of US tax treaties. In addition, they argue that the
BEAT does not override those treaties and therefore the treaties can be relied upon to
overcome the effects of the BEAT. As Rosenbloom and Shaheen conclude:
Courts generally seek to resolve apparent conflicts between the Code and the
treaties. They are reluctant to approve a statutory override of negotiated treaty
provisions even when a conflict is found. We believe they would be even less
inclined to do so in the absence of some indication that Congress intended that
result with respect to a statute enacted under a special reconciliation procedure
that did not contemplate treaty overrides, with legislative history affirmatively
indicating an intention not to override, and with nothing to the contrary in the
statutory text. We believe that the BEAT’s conflicts with the nondiscrimination
provision and its reconcilable inconsistency with the foreign tax credit provision
of U.S. treaties do not constitute treaty overrides. Therefore, for purposes of
calculating the BEAT, deductions for otherwise deductible payments to
related persons resident in treaty countries and foreign tax credits for
foreign taxes paid to treaty countries should be allowed.3
In our opinion, this conclusion is wrong, for two reasons. First, we believe that the BEAT
is not a treaty violation. Second, we believe that even if the BEAT were found to violate
treaties, it is a treaty override.
1. The BEAT Does Not Violate US Tax Treaties.
As Rosenbloom and Shaheen argue, the BEAT potentially violates two articles
of US tax treaties, article 23 (granting a foreign tax credit) and article 24
(non-discrimination). However, in our opinion neither provision is violated
by the BEAT.

Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM, the University
of Michigan.
2 George Butler Research Professor and Professor of Law, University of Houston Law
Center.
3Rosenbloom, H. David and Shaheen, Fadi, The BEAT and the Treaties (August
2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229532 (emphasis added).
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Article 23 requires the US to grant a foreign tax credit for certain foreign
taxes:
In accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of the
law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to time
without changing the general principle hereof), the United States shall
allow to a resident or citizen of the United States as a credit against the
United States tax on income applicable to residents and citizens:
a) the income tax paid or accrued to __________ by or on behalf of such
resident or citizen; and
b) in the case of a United States company owning at least 10 percent of
the voting stock of a company that is a resident of __________ and from
which the United States company receives dividends, the income tax
paid or accrued to __________ by or on behalf of the payor with respect
to the profits out of which the dividends are paid.4
The BEAT is a “limitation” of the foreign tax credit because it does not allow
foreign tax credits against BEAT tax liability. Nor does the BEAT change the
“general principle” of the foreign tax credit because credits in general are
available for foreign taxes imposed on foreign source income. The BEAT
instead imposes a US tax on US source income (the interest and royalties
paid to the foreign related party). Since 1921, the US foreign tax credit has
been limited to only foreign source income.5 No “general principle” of the
foreign tax credit is violated when the BEAT is applied to protect the US
corporate tax at source.6
What is more, the United Stated, for many years prior to the
enactment of Section 59A in 2017, had interpreted a predecessor alternative
minimum tax regime (old Section 59) that did not allow a foreign tax credit
to be fully utilized to reduce the corporate alternative minimum tax liability.7
The IRS has had a longstanding position that old Section 59’s limitation on
US Model Income Tax Treaty (2016), Art. 23.
See REVENUE ACT OF 1921, CH. 136, § 222(A)(5), 238(A), 904(A), 42 STAT. 227,
249, 258.
6 Arguably, however, a “general principle” was violated by the elimination of IRC
section 902, the indirect credit, and the substitution of a limited participation
exemption. In our opinion this was a treaty override. Similarly, the limitation of the
FTC to 80% of foreign tax under GILTI may be a treaty override. For a contrary
argument see Shaviro, Daniel, The New Non-Territorial U.S. International Tax
System, Part 1 (July 2, 2018). Tax Notes, Vol. 160, No. 1, July 2, 2018; NYU Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 18-23. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222660.
7 See I.R.C. §59a)(2)(A) (2004).
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the ability to utilize foreign tax credits under the predecessor alternative
minimum tax regime were compliant with Article 23 because of the bolded
language set forth above. 8
The Tax Court has also held that the further restriction on the
availability of the foreign tax credit relief under a generally applicable
alternative minimum tax regime did not violate U.S. tax treaties. In Pekar v.
Commissioner, 9 the Tax Court held, inter alia, that the limitations on the
availability of US foreign tax credit relief under old Section 59 did not violate
Article 23’s relief from double taxation provision under the U.S.-U.K. tax
treaty. Relying on the bolded language set forth above, the Tax Court stated
as follows:
Article 23 of the U.S.-U.K. treaty generally prohibits double
taxation and provides to U.S. residents and citizens a credit
against their U.S. income tax in an “appropriate amount”.
U.S.-U.K. treaty, art. 23(1). An “appropriate amount” is
defined as that amount of tax paid to the United Kingdom,
not to exceed the limitations provided by U.S. law for that
taxable year. Id. One of the limitations for the 1995
taxable year was the foreign tax credit limitation of
section 59. Therefore, the U.S.-U.K. treaty provides for
the imposition of the tax credit limit, and the treaty and
the Code may be harmonized and the limit applied to
petitioner.10
In dealing with this language, however, Professors Rosenbloom and Shaheen
are dismissive, stating that:
“It is possible, in other circumstances, to ponder the precise
meaning of the quoted words, but there is no need to do
that with respect to the BEAT. It envisions no statutory
foreign tax credit at all, and that is surely inconsistent with
the “general principle” of Article 23, whatever the contours
of that principle may be.”11
The error in their thinking can be demonstrated by the following
hypothetical. Suppose that the BEAT had applied a tax rate equal
to the regular corporate tax rate of 21% tax but then had provided
that foreign tax credit relief could not offset more than 11 points of
the tax computed under Section 59A. In that situation, the
minimum tax under this hypothetical regime would have
See FSA 200110019 (Dec. 6, 2001).
See Pekar v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 158 (1999).
10 See Pekar v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. at 162 (emphasis added). The Tax Court has
continued to rely on this reasoning in later decisions, thus representing a
longstanding view. See Brooke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-194, 79 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2206 (2000), aff’d 13 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
11 See Rosenbloom, H. David and Shaheen, Fadi, The BEAT and the Treaties at 3
(August 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229532.
8
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preserved residual U.S. taxation equal to 10% in all events, but “in
form” this hypothetical regime allows foreign tax credit relief of
some amount. In relevant part to this analysis, this hypothetical
regime is functionally equivalent to what Congress enacted in
Section 59A. Said differently, Section 59A provides a
concessionary rate of tax but restricts further foreign tax credit
relief that does provide a benefit under the corporate tax rate to
save the US taxing jurisdiction over the tax liability computed
under the concessionary rate of tax. The formalistic distinction
does not change the substantive reality that more than half of the
regular tax liability could be offset by US foreign tax credit relief.
The Supreme Court recently applied such an functional economic
equivalency argument in the foreign tax credit context in PPL v.
Commissioner 12 where the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the substance of the impact of a foreign tax regime was to be
considered to determine its import under US tax law. Under the
logic employed by the Supreme Court in the PPL case, the Court
should find that a US tax regime that provides for a reduced tax
rate with no foreign tax credit relief is functionally similar to an
alternative minimum tax regime that initially provides for a full
rate of tax and partially disallows usage of credits. If the latter is
acceptable as Professors Rosenbloom and Shaheen accept, then
the former substantively equivalent regime is as well.
Thus, Professors Rosenbloom’s or Shaheen’s
dismissiveness would only be relevant if Section 59A had applied
an alternative minimum tax at the regular corporate tax rate of
21%, and had denied US foreign tax credit relief in that situation,
but again that is not what Section 59A does in fact or in substance.
In our view, a court can easily understand the phrase “subject to
the limitations of the law of the United States (as it may be
amended from time to time without changing the general
principle hereof” to mean that the usage of US foreign tax credit
relief is subject to the provisions and limitations of US law of
which Section 59A is included—just like the Tax Court has already
done with respect to old Section 59 in Pekar v. Commissioner. The
natural reading of Article 23 employed by the Tax Court in Pekar v.
Commissioner harmonized old Section 59’s application with US tax
treaty obligations, and it is faithful to the intended flexibility that
was intended to be retained by the United States under Article 23
to allow it to enact domestic limitations on the availability of US
foreign tax credit relief without running afoul of Article 23.
In addition, as Rosenbloom and Shaheen explain, it is not entirely
clear that the BEAT is a covered income tax for purposes of the treaties. The
BEAT functions as an alternative minimum tax, and its base is different than
12

PPL v. Commissioner, 569 U.S. 329 (2013).
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that of the income tax (so that it would not be considered an income tax
under IRC section 901, because it is not imposed on net income). 13 This is
what Mr. Barthold seems to have had in mind in his answer to the question
whether the BEAT is a treaty override:
And I believe in particular you were talking about the proposed base
erosion anti-abuse provision of the chairman’s mark. And it is
structured as an alternative tax compared to the income tax. So I
think our view is that there is not a treaty override inherent in that
design.14
Even if Chief of Staff Barthold believed the BEAT were a covered tax, he could
well have believed that Section 59A is not a treaty override (as we so believe)
because of the flexibility and authority retained under Article 23 to “subject
[foreign tax credit relief] to the limitations of the law of the United
States (as it may be amended from time to time without changing the
general principle hereof).” Given the breadth of this language, it certainly
is plausible to believe that Chief of Staff Barthold did not think a treaty
While the AMT has been considered a covered tax, e.g., in Kappus v.
Commissioner, 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003), courts have not addressed this issue
directly. In the UK, HMRC believes that the Diverted Profits Tax (which has a
function similar to the BEAT) is not covered (and so cannot be overridden) by
double tax treaties because it is not ‘substantially similar’ to corporation tax and the
UK’s domestic law does not apply double tax treaties to DPT. A further argument is
that, as an anti-avoidance measure, DPT is consistent with the spirit and purpose of
the UK’s double tax treaties. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., Three Steps Forward,
One Step Back? Reflections on 'Google Taxes', BEPS, and the DBCT (May 24, 2016). U
of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-016; U of Michigan Public Law
Research Paper No. 516. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783858 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783
858; Dan Neidle, The Diverted Profits Tax: Flawed by Design? 2015 British Tax
Review 147 (2015).; Heather Self, The UK’s New Diverted Profit Tax: Compliance
with EU Law, 43 Intertax 333 (2015); Jonathan Peacock, U.K.’s Diverted Profits Tax:
A Regime Much, Much Broader Than its True Target? 17 European Tax Service 4
(2015). 7 Sol Picciotto, The U.K.’s Diverted Profits Tax: An Admission of Defeat or a
Pre-Emptive Strike?, Tax Notes International 239 (January 19, 2015); Paul
Rutherford, The U.K.’s Google Tax- First Thoughts, 42 Tax Planning International
Review 4 (2015); Luca Cerioni, The New “Google Tax”: The “Beginning of the End”
for Tax Residence as a Connecting Factor for Tax Jurisdiction? European Taxation
185 (May, 2015); Philip Baker, Diverted Profits Tax: A Partial Response, 2015
British Tax Review 167 (2015) (the writer advised HMRC on the compatibility of the
DPT with EU law and tax treaties).
14 Barthold, quoted in Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra. As explained below, this is not
a statement of Congressional intent.
13
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override was necessary for the BEAT to apply. However, Professors
Rosenbloom and Shaheen take from this single statement the idea that the
BEAT cannot have an application that reduces the allowance of double tax
relief, stating as follows:
Whatever [Mr. Barthold’s] reasons, the conclusion — that the BEAT was
not a treaty override — may be all that matters. If that was the working
assumption of Congress, it would not have intended for the BEAT to
override treaties.
Professors Rosenbloom and Shaheen then simply conclude that the BEAT does
not provide a foreign tax credit limitation at all and do so without addressing the
fact that Article 23 does not require such a reading and without answering why
the BEAT is a covered tax. Thus, we do not believe that BEAT is a violation of
Article 23, because (a) it may not be a covered tax, and (b) even if it is a
covered tax, it is a limitation on the foreign tax credit that is consistent with
its general principles of allowing a US tax credit against foreign taxes on
foreign source income.
As for Article 24, we have explained elsewhere why we do not believe the
BEAT violates non-discrimination. First, the BEAT applies to payments from
US parents to foreign subsidiaries, so it is not limited to payments by foreign
multinationals. This in our mind is the most important point because it
means that both foreign and US multinationals are adversely affected by the
BEAT. Second, the BEAT is not different from the old earnings stripping rule
(IRC 163(j)) which is similar to the thin capitalization rules adopted by other
countries, and is an accepted exception to non-discrimination that is needed
to protect the US tax base. Third, the BEAT is not equivalent to a denial of a
deduction because the BEAT rate is 10% and a denial of a deduction would
have increased tax by 21%. Finally, foreign related parties are simply not
comparable to US related parties because the former are not subject to US
taxing jurisdiction while the latter are.15
2. The BEAT as a Treaty Override.
Even if the BEAT were found to be inconsistent with US tax treaties, in our
opinion it overrides them.

Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., Beat It: Tax Reform and Tax Treaties (January 4, 2018). U of
Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 587; U of Michigan Law & Econ Research
Paper No. 18-003. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096879 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3096
879; Wells, Bret, Get With the BEAT (February 19, 2018). Tax Notes, February 19,
2018, p. 1023.; U of Houston Law Center No. 2018-A-4. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3143891.
15
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The U.S. position on treaty overrides can be summarized as follows.16 Under the
U.S. Constitution, "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."17 This “Supremacy Clause”
was intended to ensure the supremacy of both U.S. federal laws and treaties to
state laws, and was one of the major innovations in the Constitution.
On its face, the Supremacy Clause says nothing about the relationship between
treaties and federal laws, and it is not at all clear whether it should ever have been
interpreted as the basis for treaty overrides. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
for a long time held otherwise, deciding that under the Supremacy Clause treaties
and laws are equal and therefore the principle of lex posterior (i.e., a later law
abrogates a prior contrary law) prevails.18 In 1888, in a case that discussed the
relationship between a treaty that gave most favored nation status and a later
statute imposing tariffs, the Court held that in resolving a clear conflict between a
treaty and a federal statute, "[t]he duty of the courts is to construe and give effect
to the latest expression of the sovereign will."19 And in 1957 the Court made its
position even clearer, stating that "[a]n Act of Congress, which must comply with
the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and ... when a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict
renders the treaty null."20
The general U.S. rule is therefore that any statute that is later in time than a treaty,
and that conflicts with it in some way, is a treaty override. This rule could have
led to hundreds of tax treaty overrides each year, given the frequency of U.S. tax
legislation. But even the Senate Report does not go so far, explaining that the
courts generally strive to construe statutes to avoid treaty overrides: "[t]he
cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are two
acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible.... [T]he
intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest."21 The same
principle applies in the case of a treaty and a later statute: "When the two relate to
the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either."22 "A
treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute
unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."23
See generally Senate Report 100-445, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Tit. I, XII H. 1
(Relationship with Treaties), explaining sec. 112(aa) of S. 2238 (IRC sec. 7852) (the
“Senate Report”).
17 18 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
18 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *89.
19 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888).
20 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
21 Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
22 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 194.
23 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
16
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However, the Senate Report also makes clear that when a clear conflict does exist,
a treaty override will result: “Prior judicial efforts to find consistency between
earlier and later statutes and treaties illustrate the difficulties of determining when
application of the general later-in-time rule should result in giving effect only to
the later provision; however, these difficulties cannot be permitted to obscure the
fact that if an actual conflict does exist concerning a matter within the scope of
both an earlier treaty and a later statute, as properly construed, the later statute
prevails.”24
Moreover, this result obtains even where there is no evidence in the law or its
legislative history that a treaty override was intended. The Senate Report’s
statement in this regard fully sets out the theory underlying the U.S. position, and
it is thus worth quoting in full:
Notwithstanding Congress' intent that the [1986 Tax Reform] Act and
income tax treaties be construed harmoniously to the extent possible,
conflicts other than those addressed in this bill or in the Act ultimately
may be found or alleged to exist. Similarly, conflicts between treaties and
other acts of Congress affecting revenue are likely to be found or alleged
to exist in the future, either with respect to existing or future treaties and
statutes. The bill provides that for purpose of determining the relationship
between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting
revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by
reason of its being a treaty or a law. In adopting this rule, the committee
intends to permanently codify (with respect to tax-related provisions)
present law to the effect that canons of construction applied by the courts
to the interaction of two statutes enacted at different times apply also in
construing the interactions of revenue statutes and treaties enacted and
entered into at different times. The committee does not intend this
codification to alter the initial presumption of harmony between, for
example, earlier treaties and later statutes. Thus, for example, the bill
continues to allow an earlier ratified treaty provision to continue in effect
where there is not an actual conflict between that treaty provision and a
subsequent revenue statute (i.e., where it is consistent with the intent of
each provision to interpret them in a way that gives effect to both). Nor
does the committee intend that this codification blunt in any way the
superiority of the latest expression of the sovereign will in cases involving
actual conflicts, where that expression appears in a treaty or a statute. . . .
Although the committee believes that the bill's provision regarding the
equal status of treaties and statutes merely codifies present law, the
committee believes that this provision, and the bill's disclosure provision,
are necessary technical corrections to the Act for several reasons. The
24

Senate Report, supra.
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committee is concerned that the relationship of the tax laws and treaties is
misunderstood. The internal tax laws of most countries provide some sort
of regime for taxing either the foreign income of domestic persons, the
domestic income of foreign persons, or both. Either type of income, then,
is potentially subject to two autonomous tax systems each of which is at
best designed to mesh with other tax systems only in broad general terms.
Double taxation of the same income, or taxation of certain income by
neither system, can potentially result. Income tax treaties, in the
committee's view, are agreements that provide the mechanism for
coordinating two identified tax systems by reference to their particular
provisions and the particular tax policies they reflect, and which have as
their primary objectives is a desirable goal that serves to improve the long
term environment for commercial and financial dealings between residents
of the treaty partners.
The committee believes that when a treaty partner's internal tax laws and
policies change, treaty provisions designed and bargained to coordinate
the predecessor laws and policies must be reviewed for purposes of
determining how those provisions apply under the changed circumstances.
The committee recognizes that there are cases where giving continued
effect to a particular treaty provision does not conflict with the policy of a
particular statutory change. In certain other cases, however, a mismatch
between an existing treaty provision and a newly-enacted law may exist,
in which case the continued effect of the treaty provision may frustrate the
policy of the new internal law. In some cases the continued effect of the
existing treaty provision would be to give an unbargained-for benefit to
taxpayers or one of the treaty partners. At that point, the treaty provision
in question may no longer eliminate double taxation or prevent fiscal
evasion; if not, its intended purpose would no longer be served.
The committee recognizes that some would prefer that existing treaties be
conformed to changing U.S. tax policy solely by treaty renegotiation.
However, the committee notes that in recent years, U.S. tax laws have
been constantly changing. Moreover, once U.S. tax policy has changed,
the existence of an unbargained-for benefit created by the change would
have the effect of making renegotiation to reflect current U.S. tax policy
extremely difficult, because the other country may have little or no
incentive to remove an unbargained-for benefit whose cost is borne by the
United States.
The committee recognizes that the parties to the treaty can differ as to
whether the continued effect of a treaty provision in light of a particular
statutory change provides such an unbargained-for benefit or otherwise
frustrates the basic objectives of tax treaties. Remedies may be available in
the case of what one party views as a breach of international law.
However, the committee believes that under the constitutional system of
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government of the United States, where tax laws must be passed by both
Houses of Congress and signed by the President, and where it is the role of
the courts to decide the constitutionality of the laws and what the laws
mean, it is not the role of taxpayers, the Judicial branch, or the Executive
branch to determine that constitutionally valid statutes that actually
conflict with earlier treaties ought not to be given effect either because of
views of international law or for any other reason.
The committee is concerned that there are some who assert that
treaties receive preferential treatment in their interaction with
statutes. The committee is further concerned that whatever support is
found for this view is based on misinterpretations of authoritative
pronouncements on the subject. For example, before original
introduction of this technical corrections legislation, the Internal Revenue
Service announced that new Code section 367(e)(2), discussed above,
which imposes corporate-level tax in certain liquidations, would not apply
where it "would violate a treaty non-discrimination provision" (Notice 87–
5, 1987–1 C.B. 416). Eventually, the Internal Revenue Service withdrew
its notice on a prospective basis, and concluded that no treaty conflict
existed (Notice 87–66, 1987–2 C.B. 376). The committee is concerned
that the language used in the original notice may have suggested an
erroneous inference that, had section 367(e)(2) actually created a conflict
in a particular case, it would have been given no effect under the terms of
the original Notice. Normal application of the later-in-time rule would not
permit this result.
Other examples exist where the committee is troubled with erroneous
inferences that have apparently been drawn from language used by the
Executive branch. For example, in Revenue Ruling 80–223, 1980–2 C.B.
217, the Service considered the issue of whether foreign tax credit
provisions enacted in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (sections 901(f) and
907) prevailed over conflicting provisions in earlier treaties that provide
for foreign tax credits determined pursuant to the foreign tax credit
provisions of the Code in effect as of dates specified in such treaties. The
analysis stated the following:
In Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), subsequent inconsistent
legislation was held not to supersede an earlier treaty provision because
neither the committee reports nor the debates on the subsequent legislation
mentioned the earlier treaty. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the
legislative history underlying the enactment of sections 901(f) and 907 of
the Code for a clear indication from Congress as to whether it intended
these sections to supersede any provision of treaties entered into prior to
the enactment of these sections.
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The committee believes it would be erroneous to assert that the
absence of legislative history mentioning a treaty was sufficient to
reach the result in Cook. That case dealt with the question of how to
construe an anti-bootlegger provision (section 581 of the Tariff Act of
1930) that first became law in an act (the Tariff Act of 1922) passed early
on during Prohibition. Section 581 of the 1930 Act was a verbatim
reenactment of section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922. The scope of section
581 of the 1922 Act had been limited by a U.S.-Great Britain treaty made
in 1924. The case came before the Supreme Court as Prohibition was in
the last stages of being written out of the Constitution. The Court reached
its conclusion on the stated ground that the treaty limit continued to apply
under the 1930 Act, because section 581, "with its scope narrowed by the
Treaty, remained in force after its re-enactment in the Act of 1930." 288
U.S. at 120. Properly construed, therefore, the committee believes that
Cook stands not for the proposition that Congress must specifically advert
to treaties to have later statutes given effect, but that for purposes of
interpreting a reenacted statute, it may be appropriate for some purposes to
treat the statute as if its effect was continuous and unbroken from the date
of its original enactment.
Similarly the committee believes it would be erroneous to assert that an
income tax statute such as the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 prevails over
treaties only if treaty interactions are mentioned in the statute or legislative
history. On the other hand, the committee believes that any such mention,
if made, would be dispositive.
In view of what the committee believes is the correct treatment of
treaty-statute interactions, then, the committee finds it disturbing that
some assert that a treaty prevails over later enacted conflicting
legislation in the absence of an explicit statement of congressional
intent to override the treaty; that it is treaties, not legislation, which
will prevail in the event of a conflict absent an explicit and specific
legislative override. The committee does not believe this view has any
foundation in present law. Moreover, the committee believes that it is not
possible to insert an explicit statement addressing each specific conflict
arising from a particular act in the act or its legislative history; for in the
committee's view, it is not possible for Congress to assure itself that all
conflicts, actual or potential, between existing treaties and proposed
legislation have been identified during the legislative process of enacting a
particular amendment to the tax laws. In the absence of a clear statement
that legislation prevails over prior treaties, dubious tax avoidance
schemes, in the committee's view, have been suggested. See, e.g., Tax
Notes, March 9, 1987, at 1004, improperly suggesting that the failure to
clarify the relationship between the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982
and earlier treaties allows foreigners to own and operate U.S. business taxfree.
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The committee believes that a basic problem that gives rise to the need for
a clarification of the equality of statutes and treaties is the complexity
arising from the interaction of the Code, treaties, and foreign laws taken as
a whole. The committee notes that the United States has over 35 income
tax treaties, some of extreme complexity, plus additional treaties bearing
on income tax issues. In addition, the application of United States tax law
to complex business transactions exacerbates these complexities. The
committee does not believe that Congress can either actually or
theoretically know in advance all of the implications for each treaty, or the
treaty system, of changes in domestic law, and therefore Congress cannot
at the time it passes each tax bill address all potential treaty conflict issues
raised by that bill. This complexity, and the resulting necessary gaps in
Congressional foreknowledge about treaty conflicts, make it difficult for
the committee to be assured that its tax legislative policies are given effect
unless it is confident that where they conflict with existing treaties, they
will nevertheless prevail.
The committee further believes that codification of this rule, together with
the disclosure requirements in the bill, will lead to the early discovery of
now-unknown treaty conflicts and to their appropriate resolution. If any
case actually arises in which proper application of the canons of
construction ultimately reveals an actual conflict, the committee expects
that full legislative consideration of that conflict will take place to
determine whether application of the general later-in-time rule is
consistent with the spirit of the treaty (namely, to prevent double taxation
by an agreed division of taxing jurisdiction, and to prevent fiscal evasion)
and the proper expectations of the treaty partners.25
Against this strong legislative history, it is hard to argue, as Rosenbloom and
Shaheen do in reliance on Cook, that the absence of a clear statement of
Congressional intent means that the BEAT does not override treaties. If this were
presented to a court, in our opinion the court would not find the BEAT to be a
treaty violation for the reasons stated above. But if the court were to consider the
BEAT a treaty violation, it is hard to envisage it as concluding that the treaties
should defeat the clear intent of the BEAT, which is to protect the US tax base by
limiting the affected deductions and to not allow a foreign tax credit against the

Senate Report, supra (emphases added). The above legislative history for tax
legislation is consistent with broader scholarship on how unambiguous later-intime legislation should be understood as overruling earlier treaty provisions. See
Andrew H. Bean, Constraining Charming Betsy: Textual Ambiguity as a Predicate to
Applying the Charming Betsy Doctrine, 2015 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1801
25
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BEAT. Certainly, Mr. Barthold’s ambiguous statement cannot be relied on for this
purpose since he is not a member of Congress.26
Moreover, allowing treaties (and especially the non-discrimination article) to
overcome the BEAT would be to completely defeat the purpose of the legislation.
Any taxpayer would be able to re-structure their affairs so that payments that are
covered by the BEAT would be made to affiliates resident in treaty countries, and
soon the BEAT would have no bite at all.
Perhaps most relevant to this discussion is the substantial line of US cases that
have addressed the predecessor to Section 59A and its interpretation with existing
US treaties, namely old Section 59. In Kappus v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 1053
(D.C. Cir., 2003), the Court of Appeals addressed old Section 59’s restriction on
the ability to use foreign tax credits under the predecessor to Section 59A’s
alternative minimum tax regime. In Kappus, the Court of Appeals held
unanimously that the 90% limitation on the foreign tax credit enacted by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 overrode the US Canada Tax Treaty (1984) despite the
absence of evidence of Congressional intent to override in the legislative history
of the 1986 act.27 The court held that:
The question of whether the Treaty and statute can be harmonized as the
government suggests is an extremely close one. It is not, however, a
A stronger indication of Congressional intent may be derived from (a) the
question posed to Mr. Barthold, which suggests that Congress intended the BEAT to
apply even if it were a treaty override, (b) a hearing of the Senate Finance
Committee on October 3, 2017, in which one of us testified to the urgent need to
protect the US tax base even if it meant overriding the treaties. The US has a long
history of treaty overrides. See, e.g., IRC section 897 (FIRPTA), 884 (branch profit
tax, which overrode treaties by applying the “qualified resident” rule), 894(c), and
163(j) (which despite its nominal application to tax exempt related parties was
universally understood to apply only to foreigners and thus arguably to override
article 24(4)). See generally Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., Tax Treaty Overrides: A Qualified
Defense of Us Practice (October 12, 2005). Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=829746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.82974
6.
27 Kappus v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In Owner–Operator
Independent Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States Departmentof Transportation, No.
12–1264 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the DC Circuit refused to allow a general statute requiring
truck drivers to have a medical certificate to override an earlier executive
agreement with Mexico exempting Mexican drivers from such a requirement absent
clear evidence of Congressional intent. We think this case is distinguishable,
because there was no indication Congress considered the Mexico executive
agreement when it enacted the general statute, while in the case of BEAT, Congress
clearly was aware of the potential override issue presented by the BEAT, given the
question Barthold answered.
26
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question that we need resolve. The Kappuses concede that, even if their
reading of the Treaty is correct and the Treaty and § 59(a)(2) are in
irreconcilable conflict, the statute nonetheless would control their tax
liability if it were the most recent relevant provision. Accordingly,
because we conclude in Part III that the statute is in fact the last relevant
provision, we need not further pursue the search for harmony. See South
African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 125-26 (D.C.Cir.1987) (assuming
arguendo the existence of a conflict between a treaty and a statute, and
resolving the case on the basis of the last-in-time principle); Jamieson v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372, 1373-74 (Tax
Ct.1995) (holding, in a case prior to the amending protocols, that §
59(a)(2) prevailed over the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty under the last-in-time
principle without determining whether they were in conflict), aff'd, 132
F.3d 1481 (D.C.Cir.1997).
It is true that the court relied in part on a general clarification in TAMRA (1988)
that Congress intended to override the treaties when enacting 1986 act. But that
clarification was not specific to the 90% limit, and in any case was subsequent to
the 1986 act and not part of its legislative history. Thus, Kappus stands for the
proposition that when a conflict between a treaty and a statute clearly exists, the
latter in time rule is dispositive even in the absence of legislative history, and
even when the override is a clear violation of the spirit of the treaty (which in our
opinion the BEAT is not).
Professors Rosenbloom and Shaheen fail to address the holding of Lindsey
v. Commissioner,28 albeit they do cite this case in a string cite. In Lindsey v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court was confronted with whether the alternative
minimum tax regime under Section 59 that did not allow for full usage of US
foreign tax credit relief violated the U.S. treaty obligations to provide double tax
relief under the Canadian treaty. The taxpayer urged the court to harmonize the
manner of Section 59’s application so that it would not restrict the usage of US
foreign tax credit relief. The Tax Court rejected that invitation, and it applied old
Section 59 without adjustment claiming that the later in time rule applied.29
Given this holding with respect to the predecessor alternative minimum tax
regime under old Section 59, it is difficult to imagine that the Tax Court would
use logic it rejected in Lindsey to find that the successor Section 59A could not be
applied without restriction as an override to any previously enacted treaty
obligation.
To conclude: Contrary to Rosenbloom and Shaheen, for purposes of
calculating the BEAT, deductions for otherwise deductible payments to related
persons resident in treaty countries and foreign tax credits for foreign taxes paid
See Lindsey v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 672 (1992).
See Lindesy v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 672 (1992) aff’d mem (15 F.3d 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). Professors Rosenbloom and Shaheen fail to explain why this prior law
do not sufficiently answer their objections with respect to the interpretive issues
under the successor alternative minimum tax regime now contained in Section 59A.
28
29

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/157

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232974

14

Avi-Yonah and Wells:

to treaty countries should not be allowed. Any argument to the contrary is
inconsistent with the clear Congressional purpose of enacting the BEAT, which
was to protect the US tax base from inflated deductions paid to related foreign
parties that are not subject to US tax jurisdiction.
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